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Abstract
Sentence enhancements may reduce crime both by deterring potential criminals
and by incapacitating previous offenders, removing these possible recidivists
from society for longer periods. I estimate the incapacitative effect of longer
sentences by exploiting a 2001 change in Maryland’s sentencing guidelines that
reduced the sentences of 23-, 24-, and 25-year-olds with juvenile delinquent
records by a mean of 222 days. I ﬁnd that, during this sentence disenhancement,
offenders were, on average, arrested for 2.8 criminal acts and were involved in
1.4–1.6 serious crimes per person during the period when they would have
otherwise been incarcerated. Although my ﬁndings are signiﬁcantly lower than
previous estimates of incapacitation, I ﬁnd that, on the margin, the social beneﬁt
of the crimes averted by incapacitation is slightly higher than the marginal cost
to the state of imposing a 1-year sentence enhancement.
1. Introduction
Between 1984 and 2004, the number of people imprisoned in the United States
grew from 682,000 to over 2.1 million,
1 a 20-year growth rate that was 10 times
that of the U.S. population as a whole. Part of this growth can undoubtedly be
attributed to an increase in the ﬂow of people into the prison system—a trend
driven by rising crime rates through the late 1980s and policies favoring incar-
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ceration over ﬁnes. Equally important, however, was a decrease in the outﬂow
of inmates from the prison system back into society. Driving this trend was the
widespread adoption of sentence enhancement policies designed to increase the
severity of punishment by lengthening sentences and increasing incarceration
time. Among the most popular sentence enhancement policies implemented over
this period were mandatory minimum sentences, which obliged judges to adhere
to strict minimum sentence lengths for certain crimes, and three-strikes laws,
which required incarceration for repeat offenders.
In light of these patterns and policies and a remarkable drop in crime rates
in the 1990s, a general consensus has emerged that the criminal justice system
as a whole (including policing, sentencing,andincarceration)reducestheamount
of crime in society (Doob and Webster 2003; Levitt 2001). However, concerns
regarding the timing and the application of sentence enhancement policies, as
well as the confounding effects of other policy changes in the justice system,
have resulted in little consensus on how changes in sentencing have contributed
to reductions in criminal activity.
2 The relationship between incarceration and
crime rates is further complicated because incarceration theoretically has two
distinct effects on individual criminal behavior: deterrence and incapacitation.
A deterred offender is able to commit crime but chooses not to, whereas an
incapacitated offender would choose to commit crime but is unable to do so.
The relative contribution of these factors to the decline in crime has important
ﬁscal implications for governments.
If the threat of longer sentences deters criminal behavior, the state does not
have to increase spending on arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. Although
this outcome is promising, empirical evidence of a deterrent effect is mixed at
best
3 and must be weighed against the ability of other social programs to alter
behavior.
4 In the case of incapacitation, on the other hand, the government must
make a nontrivial ﬁscal outlay on prison construction and inmate supervision,
5
and longer periods of incarceration may impose nontrivial costs on family mem-
bers, health, and labor market opportunities for the offenders.
6
2 For extensive and critical reviews of research on incapacitation and deterrence, see Zimring and
Hawkins (1995), Spelman (2000), Doob and Webster (2003), and Levitt (2001).
3 Reviews of the literature by Nagin (1998), Levitt (2001), and Doob and Webster (2003) highlight
the contentious nature of the debate over sentence enhancements and deterrence. Becker (1968)
suggests that rational criminals would be deterred by harsher punishments, but Lee and McCrary
(2006) demonstrate how high discount rates result in rational criminalsbeingundeterredbyincreased
sanctions.
4 Donohue and Siegelman (1998), for example, suggest that early childhood interventions are at
least as cost-effective as increased incarceration in reducing crime.
5 Greenwood et al. (1996) estimate that the effect of California’s three-strikes law on the prison
population could cost the state $5.5 billion per year.
6 This observation follows from the Becker (1971) model of discrimination. Pager (2003) ﬁnds
evidence of negative effects of incarceration on future employment of a magnitude similar to those
for racial discrimination. Recent work by Oliver et al. (2006) highlights the link between black male
imprisonment and black child poverty. Recent work by Johnson and Raphael (2009) suggests that
the high incarceration rates among black Americans can explain a large fraction of racial disparities
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This paper seeks to untangle the relationship between sentence length and
crime, isolating the incapacitative effect of sentence enhancements and weighing
the ﬁscal costs and social beneﬁts of such policies. Early studies of incapacitation
characterize the effect as removing a “slice” of a criminal career (Shinnar and
Shinnar 1975; Blumstein 1983), potentially reducing crime as offenders are pre-
vented from reentering society. The number of crimes prevented through in-
capacitation bya sentence enhancementequalsthenumberofcrimesincarcerated
offenders would have committed if they were on the streets during that en-
hancement. The empirical task is to create a plausible estimate of this number.
Self-reports of criminal behavior immediately prior to incarceration,
7 which
Zimring and Hawkins (1995) characterize as the “window period,” have pro-
duced estimates of incapacitation that range from 187 crimes prevented per
prisoner-year (Zedlewski 1987) to 12 or fewer such crimes (DiIulio and Piehl
1991, 1995). Setting aside the wide range of these estimates, it is unclear that
the potential criminal behavior of the average incarcerated inmate is the relevant
metric when thinking about longer sentences. Sentence enhancements increase
the incapacitation only of inmates who are about to be released, and the stock
of incarcerated offenders is likely to be signiﬁcantly more criminal than the
exiting ﬂow from that population (see Donohue and Siegelman 1998; Cavanagh
and Kleiman 1990).
8 Existing literature has generated estimates of an average
effect: how many crimes does incarceration prevent? This paper estimates a
marginal effect: how many crimes are prevented by longer periods of incarcer-
ation? Finally, the cited studies rely on data collected before 2000, and the large
decline in aggregate crime rates during the late 1990s casts doubt on the ap-
plicability of past estimates of incapacitation to current policy.
9
An ideal way to estimate the effect of sentence enhancements on crime would
be to randomly assign offenders to short and long prison sentences. In that case,
the average criminal behavior of the “lucky” offenders receiving the shorter
sentences can be interpreted as the criminal activity the “unlucky” offenders
were prevented from engaging in during their sentence enhancement. Once the
unlucky offenders are released, the difference between their criminal behavior
and the contemporaneous criminal behavior of the lucky offenders provides
insight on the effect of sentence length on criminal behavior.
I approximate this ideal experiment using quasi-experimental variation in
7 This approach, used by Zedlewski (1987), DiIulio and Piehl (1991, 1995), and Cohen (1983) is
based on the model of incapacitation and the criminal career developed in Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar
(1973) and Shinnar and Shinnar (1975). Recent research by Bhati (2007) builds on these models
using information theory to model hypothetical criminal behavior over the life course.
8 If offenders tend to be incarcerated after pronounced increases in their rate of criminal behavior
(Zimring and Hawkins 1995), this upward bias is exacerbated.
9 Johnson and Raphael (2007) develop a model of incarceration and crime rates that allows them
to separate exogenous and endogenous changes in the two over time. They then apply their model
to crime and incarceration data from before and after 1990 and ﬁnd that the implied elasticity of
crime with respect to prison beds has fallen by as much as 70 percent. Research on adolescent
incapacitation by Sweeten and Apel (2007) also ﬁnds that the potential beneﬁts of incapacitation
may have fallen over time as well.554 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
sentence length created by a change in Maryland law that reduced the recom-
mended sentences for a speciﬁc group of individuals 23–25 years old. In Mary-
land, a recommended sentence is calculated for each convicted offender on the
basis of his criminal history and the crime for which he is convicted using a
point system developed by the Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sen-
tencing Policy (MSCCSP). On July 1, 2001, a policy change reduced the age at
which an offender’s juvenile record was excluded from the criminal history, from
26 to 23 years. After controlling for characteristics of the offender and crime, I
ﬁnd that each additional juvenile delinquent point ofﬁcially assigned to an of-
fender increased incarceration length by a mean of 222 days.
After observing the number of delinquent points offenders sentenced after
July 1, 2001, would have qualiﬁed for under the prior regime, I then estimate
the additional days of incarceration that offenders with juvenile histories would
have received if they had been sentenced under the old guidelines. Under the
assumption that the change in sentencing is unrelated to changes in underlying
criminality, the offense rate—or number of crimes per year—of the lucky former
delinquents in this postrelease window serves as the counterfactual for the num-
ber of crimes that the unlucky 23–25-year-olds would have committed if they
had been released early.
I ﬁnd that offenders are arrested at a mean rate of 2.8 times per year and are
involved in approximately 1.5 index crimes (murder, manslaughter, assault, rob-
bery, rape, car theft, burglary, and larceny) per year during the period when
they would have otherwise been incarcerated. A back-of-the-envelope cost-
beneﬁt analysis suggests that, although the marginal beneﬁt of incapacitation is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the average effect, the social beneﬁt does outweigh the
marginal cost of incarcerating a prisoner for an additional year.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the ﬁrst section, I describe the Maryland
sentencing process and the 2001 law change in detail. A discussion of the data
set I use and the econometric model follows. In Section 4, I present my estimates
of the number of crimes that sentence enhancements prevent by incapacitation.
I discuss the costs associated with sentence enhancements in Section 5 and offer
a concluding discussion in Section 6.
2. Sentencing in Maryland
Maryland is one of 25 states in which guidelines are used to determine the
sentence of a convicted offender.
10 An adult convicted of a crime in a Maryland
circuit court is assigned two numeric scores—one characterizing the offense and
the other the offender. These scores and a corresponding range of recommended
sentences are given to the judge prior to sentencing. The midpoint of this range
is highly correlated with sentence length ( ), and although judges are not r p .6
10 This count includes the District of Columbia.Sentence Enhancements 555
penalized for deviating, roughly half of sentences fall within this range.
11 More-
over, these scores and sentencing guidelines further inﬂuence an inmate’s actual
time served because they are later used by parole boards in deciding whether to
release an incarcerated offender.
Although the offense scores identify the type and severity of the crime com-
mitted, the offender score is most relevant in assessing the group affected by the
change in law examined in this paper. This score is calculated as the sum of
four elements—the individual’s adult criminal history, juvenile criminal history,
history of parole violations, and relationship to the criminal justice system at
the time of the offense—with a maximum score of 9. Most important to my
identiﬁcation strategy is the assignment of delinquent points to this score. Before
the change in law, an offender who was younger than 26 and who had committed
a previous crime as a juvenile could receive up to 2 delinquent points, with each
point resulting in a longer recommended sentence.
12 To the extent that parole
boards took sentences and delinquent points into account, 23-, 24-, and 25-
year-olds with juvenile histories potentially received signiﬁcant reductions in
incapacitation.
In 1998, the MSCCSP became concerned that their treatment of adults with
juvenile histories was too harsh relative to that in other states.
13 To rectify this
inequity, the commission determined that delinquent points would be assigned
only to offenders aged 22 years or younger at the time of offense. The revised
guidelines, in which offenders aged out of their juvenile histories at 23 instead
of 26 years, went into effect on July 1, 2001. This meant that 23-, 24-, and 25-
year-old offenders who would have had delinquent points added to their offender
score before July 1, 2001, instead received 0 points thereafter.
How does the recommended sentence translate to actual sentence length and
time served? The average effect on the amount of time served by 23–25-year-
olds is shown in Figure 1. The null hypothesis that nondelinquents and former
delinquents were incarcerated for equivalent amounts of time is easily rejected
under the old guidelines ( ) but not under the new guidelines ( t p 5.04 t p
). The policy-relevant window of free time during which I measure inca- .85
pacitation is the number of extra days of incarceration lucky former delinquents
would have received if sentenced under the old guidelines.
11 Annual reports by the MSCCSP indicate that, between 1999 and 2002, roughly 50 percent of
imposed sentences fell within the recommended range. Since 2002, the percentage of sentences that
fall within this range has been above 70 percent.
12 One delinquent point was assigned if the offender had two or more past ﬁndings of juvenile
delinquency or one conﬁnement and had not remained crime free for more than 5 years. A record
of multiple conﬁnements resulted in 2 delinquent points being added to the offender score.
13 As noted by Dr. Charles Wellford, MSCCSP member and former chair, telephone conversation
with the author, October 2005.556 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
Figure 1. Average incarceration spells of all 23–25-year-old males by delinquent status
3. Data and Econometric Approach
3.1. Data Description
I use data from the MSCCSP on 3,345 sentences of males between the ages
of 23 and 25 who were sentenced between 1999 and 2004. Each observation
includes the name, race, and date of birth of the convicted offender as well as
information on the elements of his offender and offense scores, the jurisdiction
in which he was sentenced, and the date he was sentenced. I identify the number
of delinquent points a 23–25-year-old sentenced after July 1, 2001, would have
received under the old regime using his prior convictions in Maryland circuit
court.
The goal of this paper is to estimate the number of crimes averted per year
of additional incarceration. The relevant denominator is time served, not sen-
tence length. To obtain time served, the sentencing data are linked to incarcer-
ation data from the administrative records of the Anne Arundel, Prince George’s,
and Washington Counties’ Departments of Corrections and the Maryland De-
partment of Public Safety andCorrectionalServices,whichoverseestheBaltimore
City jails and Maryland state prisons. Approximately 39 percent of Maryland
residents lived in one of these jurisdiction in 2000,
14 and 64 percentof convictions
between 1999 and 2004 occurred in one of these four jurisdictions.
I proxy for the number of crimes averted with the number of arrests accu-
mulated by lucky delinquents when they would have otherwise been incarcerated.
14 U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts: Maryland (http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/24/24510.html).Sentence Enhancements 557
Table 1
Characteristics of 23–25-Year-Old Offenders Sentenced in Maryland, 1999–2004
Old Guidelines New Guidelines
Nondelinquent Delinquent Nondelinquent Delinquent
Total days served 687 (818) 1,274 (920) 510 (549) 471 (489)
Sentence length
a 37.2 (56.2) 96.2 (100) 45.1 (84.3) 50.4 (69.8)
Incarcerated (%) 76.9 93.8 74.5 78.9
Not released (%) 15.1 35.0 26.9 24.1
Total charges 1.40 (.94) 1.98 (1.79) 1.54 (1.41) 1.96 (3.83)
2nd Sentence (%) 2.0 4.1 1.8 2.2
Worst offense type (%):
Drug 64.0 42.3 61.2 68.4
Violent 27.6 38.1 28.8 23.3
Property 8.2 19.6 9.2 8.3
VOP .2 .0 .8 .0
Worst offense score 5.23 (2.19) 5.85 (2.64) 4.92 (2.14) 5.00 (2.29)
Delinquent points N.A. 1.28 (.45) N.A. 1.27 (.44)
Nondelinquent
offender score 3.16 (2.30) 4.82 (1.79) 3.36 (2.14) 4.48 (2.20)
Age at offense 24.0 (.81) 23.7 (.75) 23.9 (.82) 23.6 (.77)
Black (%) 83.9 76.3 81.4 80.4
Sentences 1,179 97 1,940 133
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. VOP p violation of parole; N.A. p not applicable.
aSentence length is reported in months, with 101 serious offenses excluded.
The Maryland Arrest Repository data, or rap sheet data, obtained from the
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services record every
arrest made by a law enforcement agency in Maryland and track individuals
using a ﬁngerprint-supported state identiﬁcation number. The rap sheet data
allow me to add information on dates of arrest, reasons for arrest, and arresting
agency for each individual who has a Maryland arrest record through January
5, 2006.
15
Table 1 compares the race, offense scores, offense types, and observed incar-
ceration spells of former delinquents and nondelinquents in my sample. Unlucky
former delinquents appear to have spent almost 2 additional years incarcerated
relative to offenders without delinquent records, whereas lucky offenders appear
to serve slightly less time, if any, than nondelinquents overall. Comparing mean
observed time served is potentially misleading because right censoring (namely,
of incomplete incarceration spells) creates an upper bound on the difference
between sentences of lucky delinquents and nondelinquents who are sentenced
toward the end of the observed time frame. An alternative way to illustrate the
changing effect of delinquent points on incarceration is to compare the mean
sentence passed down by a judge. The second row of Table 1 presents mean
15 Creating a complete set of sentence, intake, release, and arrest dates requires that I exclude a
nontrivial fraction of my affected sample. Table A1 describes the characteristics of 2,502 convictions
that are excluded from the sample. For a detailed discussion of the excluded and included cases, see
Owens (2007, pp. 90–147).558 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
sentences passed down by judges. Former delinquents sentenced under the old
guidelines received sentences of 96 months on average, compared with 37-month
sentences given to nondelinquents. Under the new guidelines,formerdelinquents
received sentences of 50 months on average, only 5 months more than
nondelinquents.
Former delinquents sentenced under the new guidelines were much more
likely (68 percent versus 42 percent) to be convicted of drug offenses than were
those convicted under the old guidelines.
16 There are two reasons for this. I am
more likely to be able to identify drug offenders as former delinquents if drug
offenders move in and out of the legal system at a higher frequency than other
types of offenders. Alternately, if prosecutors see drug offenders as less dangerous
than those convicted of violent or property offenses, they may be less likely to
assign these particular offenders ofﬁcial delinquent enhancements.
17 This is po-
tentially an area of concern if there is heterogeneity in the effect of the delinquent
enhancement on sentence length across offense types. In Table A2, I examine
this possibility. In this particular sample, I ﬁnd no compelling evidence of a
heterogeneous effect. In all other respects, the demographic characteristics of
the four groups are generally similar.
It is possible that the sentence disenhancement that delinquent 23–25-year-
olds received after July 1, 2001, induced some of those delinquents to commit
crime. By lowering the severity of the punishment they would receive, 23–25-
year-olds with delinquent records who may have chosen not to commit crimes
prior to July 1, 2001, may have done so once the new guidelines were in place.
18
If this were the case, lucky former delinquents would be, on average, less criminal
than unlucky former delinquents, and I cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the adult criminal histories are constant over time. This speciﬁc policy change
was not publicized, and a Lexis-Nexis search of major and local Maryland news-
papers between 1998 and 2004 found no mention of this change in the guidelines.
3.2. Econometric Approach
To estimate how many crimes could have been prevented by the juvenile
sentence enhancement, it is necessary to know how long a lucky delinquent
would have been incarcerated in the absence of the rule change. I use a difference-
in-difference approach, comparing the change in time served for former delin-
quents to the change for nondelinquents, whose sentences are independent of
how delinquent points are calculated.
19 As shown in Table 2, on average, former
16 This pattern is not evident in former delinquents between 20 and 22 years old.
17 This is similar to the phenomenon of diagnosis-related-group creepidentiﬁedbySimborg(1981).
18 This is a logical extension of the Becker (1968) model of criminal behavior.
19 Several other changes in the guidelines went into effect on July 1, 2001, including a change in
the penalty for crimes against the elderly and the inclusion of victim information in the worksheet.
As long as these additional changes affected former delinquents and nondelinquents equally, this
should not bias my estimate. This assumption can be veriﬁed by examining the effect of the change
in the guidelines on the sentences of males in different age groups.Sentence Enhancements 559
Table 2
Sentence Length and Time Served (in Months) for 20–25-Year-Olds Over Time
Sentence Length Time Served
Difference
Old
Guidelines
New
Guidelines
Old
Guidelines
New
Guidelines
23–25-Year-olds:
Nondelinquent (N p 3,119) 46.4 (3.19) 61.0 (3.39) 23.2 (.803) 17.9 (.435) 5.27 (.839)
1 Point (N p 167) 97.4 (14.2) 63.4 (12.7) 42.9 (3.67) 15.6 (1.63) 27.2 (3.66)
2 Points (N p 63) 150.8 (60.5) 380.1 (242) 45.9 (5.94) 19.1 (3.24) 26.8 (6.36)
20–22-Year-olds:
Nondelinquent (N p 3,984) 41.1 (2.88) 42.7 (2.22) 22.4 (.703) 14.5 (.350) 7.86 (.709)
1 Point (N p 723) 77.4 (8.77) 97.6 (17.7) 32.1 (1.85) 22.9 (.904) 9.24 (1.84)
2 Points (N p 241) 94.4 (24.8) 109 (14.5) 38.0 (2.95) 29.7 (1.59) 8.30 (3.12)
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes outliers.
delinquents with 1 delinquent point received sentences of 97.4 months (SE p
14.2) if sentenced under the old guidelines, compared with 63.4 months (SE p
12.7) afterward. These different sentences resulted in an average reduction in
time served of 23.4 months (SE p 3.52), or about 702 days per delinquent
point.
20 In comparison, 23–25-year-olds without delinquent records were incar-
cerated for 23.2 months (SE p .80) prior to July 1, 2001, and 17.9 months (SE
p .435) after that date. A basic comparison of means suggests that, on average,
lucky former delinquents would have spent an additional 544 days in prison for
each delinquent point in their record if they had been subject to the old
guidelines.
In an interesting falsiﬁcation test of this effect, I see no such pattern for
convicted males between the ages of 20 and 22. There is no statistically or
substantively signiﬁcant difference in the periods of incarceration for former
delinquents over time that is not explained by changes in punishment for non-
delinquents. This ﬁnding supports the argument that the reductionintimeserved
for 23-, 24-, and 25-year-old former delinquents was due to this speciﬁc sentence
disenhancement rather than some other consistent pattern placing greater em-
phasis on age or less emphasis on offender scores in sentencing and parole
decisions.
Assuming that each lucky delinquent would have been released 544 days later
under the old guidelines requires assumptions that would make incapacitation
estimates unbelievable. Close inspection of Tables 1 and 2 substantiates two
primary sources of concern. First, there are observable dimensions on which
former delinquents vary over time. The top 95th percentile of convicted counts
for 23–25-year-olds with 2 delinquent points increases from four to over 15 after
July 1, 2001. As a result, the average sentence length appears to increase over
time for this group. A simple test of difference in means also does not account
20 This ﬁgure is calculated as the weighted average reduction per point for 23–25-year-old delin-
quents in Table 2.560 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
Figure 2. Percentage of convicted 23–25-year-old males incarcerated by delinquent status
for the fact that 766 of these sentences are incomplete at the time of observation,
which means that I do not observe the total amount of time served in each case.
In particular, the largest possible value of observed time served is smaller for
individuals sentenced after July 1 than before.
Comparing mean time served also requires the assumption that delinquent
points equally affected the probability and length of incarceration. When the
average time served in Figure 1 is distilled into Figures 2 and 3, it is evident
that changes in the intensive margin (Figure 3) are driving the break in trend
at the date of the guideline. This is an intuitive result: someone convicted of
murder will be incarcerated even if it is the ﬁrst offense, whereas someone
convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia will typically not be incarcerated
for that offense, even if he has a long criminal record.
21
To obtain a more accurate estimate of the additional amount of time a lucky
former delinquent would have been incarcerated, I use a two-step estimation
procedure. First, I model the extensive margin (Figure 2), the probability of
being incapacitated for any period of time, using a probit model, where the
dependent variable equals one if Sentencei results in any period of incarceration:
PP () PS * 1 0FX pF[b Facts  a OldGuide  a D ii i OG i D i
()  a OldGuide # D ].
(1)
OGD ii
21 DiIulio (1996) points out that the most controversial aspect of California’s three-strikes law was
the increased weight of an individual’s criminal history over the immediate offense in determining
whether to incarcerate someone.Sentence Enhancements 561
Figure 3. Average incarceration spells of incarcerated 23–25-year-old males by delinquent
status.
I control for the facts of the case, , which include the offender score
P Factsi
minus any delinquent points, the offense scores of the three mostseriousoffenses,
and the total number of criminal acts for which the offender is convicted. I also
control for whether the offender is black, whether the offender is later convicted
of an additional offense (that could have occurred at any time) while serving
the current sentence, and the offender’s age at the time of the most serious
offense. Because the offense scores of drug, property, and violent offenses are
calculated differently, I allow the effect of the offense score to vary with offense
type, and I adjust the standard errors in my model to allow for unobserved
correlation in incarceration length over time for offenses of the same type within
a jurisdiction. The estimated values of aOG, aD, and aOGD represent the change
in probability of incarceration associated with delinquent status Di, being sen-
tenced under the old guidelines OldGuidei, and having delinquent points in-
cluded in the offender score.
Turning to changes in incarceration on the intensive margin (Figure 2), I
restrict my attention to convictions in which an offender was incapacitated for
at least 1 day.
22 I assume that, for all convictions that result in incarceration,
22 This includes pretrial detention. I am not able to determine whether an individual received
credit for pretrial detention at sentencing and therefore assume that it was always awarded.562 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
actual sentence length (measured in days) follows a negative binomial dis- S* i
tribution, with
d y () Gd y dl i () PS * p y p ,( 2 ) i () () () ( ) G y  1 Gd dld  l ii
where
NN l p exp[q  b Facts  v OldGuide  v D ii OG i D i
()  v OldGuide # D ].
(3)
OGD ii i
I model the actual incarceration spell, , of male 23–25-year-olds in Maryland S* i
as a function of the facts of the case, ; a dummy variable, OldGuidei,t h a t
N Factsi
equals one if the sentence took place under the old guidelines regime; the total
delinquent points, Di, that the offender would qualify for if the guidelines had
not been revised; and the interaction of total delinquent points and being sen-
tenced under the old guidelines. Because additional unobserved factors may be
related to both my observed characteristics and sentence length, in this speci-
ﬁcation I include in dummy variables for the jurisdiction of sentence,
N Factsi
which control for time-invariant differences in judicial and policing practices
across counties, and either a set of biannual dummy variables
23 or jurisdiction-
speciﬁc time trends, which control for statewide changes over time that may
affect sentencing, such as political pressure (circuit court judges are elected every
2 years), prison overcrowding, or statewide changes in police tactics.
24
I estimate the parameters of this equation by maximizing an adjusted negative
binomial likelihood function, where I account for the difference in , the actual S* i
amount of incarceration associated with Sentencei, and , the length of time I
C Si
observe someone spending in prison or jail. I then use the estimated values of
aOG, aD, aOGD, vOG, vD, and vOGD from these two equations to predicttheadditional
amount of incarceration each delinquent point caused, allowing for a hetero-
geneous affect of delinquent points on extensive and intensive margins.
25
My primary estimation results from equations (1) and (3), as well as tests of
my modeling assumptions, are presented in Table 3. I ﬁnd that the potential
sentence enhancement per delinquent point ranged from 10 to 1,319 days, with
23 In a linear model, the difference-in-difference estimator, which is marginal effect of interest, is
completely captured in the coefﬁcient on the interaction term. In a nonlinear model such as this
one, the ﬁrst-order effects do not completely drop out of the marginal effect and, therefore, must
be identiﬁed. To be able to identify any ﬁrst-order effect of being sentenced under the old guidelines,
in the ﬁxed-effects model I drop both biannual dummy variables for 2001. See Ai and Norton (2003).
24 Because I have complete sets of time served for a subset of jurisdictions, jurisdiction-speciﬁc
effects are perfect predictors of incarceration in equation (1). For example, while Iobserveconvictions
that resulted in no time served in Prince George’s County, I observe time served in Montgomery
County only for convictions that resulted in a sentence of 12 months or longer.
25 A detailed discussion of my estimation procedure is included in the Appendix.T
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a mean possible enhancement of 222 days (SE p 41.6 days).
26 Note that this
estimate is statistically robust to alternate speciﬁcations—6-month ﬁxed effects
instead of time trends, using a censored Tobit model instead of my two-step
procedure, and restricting my attention only to completed periods of incarcer-
ation. Instead of following each offender for a ﬁxed amount of time before or
after incarceration, I now have a policy-relevant period of time, a postrelease
window with which to estimate the incapacitative effect of sentence enhance-
ments. Any crime committed by a convicted offender during this postrelease
window period is an offense that would have been prevented by incapacitation
under the old sentencing guidelines.
3.2. Estimating the Incapacitative Effect
I use a two-part decision rule for selecting the ﬁnal sample of 23–25-year-
olds. First, the offender must serve at least 1 day in jail or prison. Second, I
must observe the offender when he is released. This decision rule limits my
sample to 133 of 230 delinquent 23–25-year-olds, 73 of whom were sentenced
after 2001.
27 Table 4 compares characteristics of the lucky and unlucky former
delinquents who were incarcerated and released. In terms of offender and worst
offense scores, there does not appear to be a substantial difference between the
lucky and unlucky delinquents who are released, and I cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the prior records of these two groups of offenders are equal
( ). The postrelease criminal behavior of lucky offenders can therefore be t p .78
used as a reasonable estimate of the crimes unlucky offenders would have com-
mitted had their juvenile history not been a factor at sentencing.
Using the estimated sentence enhancement that lucky delinquents would have
received under the old guidelines, I calculate a hypothetical late release date for
each of the 73 formerdelinquents. Onthe basisofmyregressionresults,Iestimate
possible sentence enhancements ranging from 75 to 302 days per delinquent
point. I reﬁne the length of each postrelease window of these 73 former delin-
quents, adjusting it to equal the difference between their hypothetical release
date and actual release date, subtracting anytime theyspentreincarceratedduring
that period. Taking reincarceration into account, these offenders spent an average
of 164 free days on the street when they would have been incarcerated under
the old guidelines, with the shortest potential free period being 1 day and the
longest slightly over 1 year. I observe the number of arrests each of these in-
dividuals accumulates during his postrelease window and divide the number of
arrests by the number of days he was at risk of committing a crime. Multiplying
this daily arrest rate by 365 gives me an annual arrest rate.
For many reasons, arrest rates do not necessarily correspond with actual of-
26 I adjust my standard errors to allow for arbitrary correlation in time served for violent, property,
and drug convictions within a jurisdiction in any 6-month interval.
27 Twenty-eight of 133 sentences of lucky former delinquents do not result in incarceration, and
an additional 32 sentences are not complete. Of the 97 sentences of unlucky former delinquents,
only six do not result in incarceration and 34 are not complete.Sentence Enhancements 565
Table 4
Characteristics of Incarcerated and Released Former Delinquents
Nondelinquents Unlucky Delinquents Lucky Delinquents
Days incarcerated 492.0 (438.8) 847.9 (621.3) 401.6 (318.8)
Worst offense type (%):
Drug 63.3 45.6 75.3
Violent 25.9 33.3 16.4
Property 10.2 21.0 8.2
Worst offense score 4.71 (1.58) 5.08 (1.78) 4.59 (1.80)
Delinquent points N.A. 1.28 (.45) 1.30 (.46)
Nondelinquent offender score 3.55 (2.08) 4.70 (1.73) 4.60 (2.18)
Age at observation 26.7 (1.76) 27.4 (2.02) 25.8 (1.32)
Black (%) 80.5 68.4 80.8
Total arrests in window 1.17 (2.98) 1.30 (2.44) 1.38 (3.35)
Total charges in window .74 (2.24) .79 (1.41) .90 (2.28)
N 1,628 57 73
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. N.A. p not applicable.
fense rates. I correct for the inexact mapping between arrests and offenses by
multiplying the number of times an individual is arrested by the clearance rate
for the arresting agency.
28 This calculation is straightforward for index crimes.
The clearance rate is the number of conﬁrmed offenses known to a given agency
in a particular year divided by the number of offenses cleared due to an arrest
by that agency that year, as reported in the Uniform Crime Reports.
29 However,
this transformation is not possible for all other offenses, including drug offenses,
kidnapping, arson, fraud, and alcohol-impaired driving. Because no measure-
ment of drug offenses analogous to that in the Uniform Crime Reports exists,
I report only the number of expected arrests on drug charges per person per
year.
30
4. The Incapacitative Effect of Sentence Enhancements
Table 5 presents my estimate of the average number of crimes prevented
through incapacitation per person per year, on the basis of the number of times
the 73 lucky former delinquents were arrested during their postrelease window.
Just over 30 percent of the lucky former delinquents were arrested for a total
102 criminal acts while they otherwise would have remained incarcerated, and
their offense rates suggest that incarcerating a former delinquent for 1 additional
year prevents 2.8 arrests in that year. Of those arrests, the state ﬁles an average
of two charges per year against former delinquents during that marginal year.
28 Spelman (1994, p. 168) says there is “no dispute” over the use of this procedure.
29 Table A3 displays these average clearance rates by index crime for law enforcement agencies
nationwide and in Maryland. Nationwide, an average of 7.61 crimes are reported to police for every
cleared offense, which is approximately equivalent to clearance rates in Maryland.
30 Estimates by Abt Associates (2001) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (2009) imply that any-
where from 40 to 2,030 drug transactions occur per arrest for drug offenses. Thanks are due to
Jonathan Caulkins for directing me to these national estimates and pointing out their limitations.566 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
Table 5
Crimes Averted through Incapacitation: Indicators of Mean Annual
Crime Rates of 23–25-Year-Olds Released Early
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Free days 164 (9.46) 151 (9.86) 208 (13.5) 113 (5.70)
Recidivism rate (%) 30.1 (.05) 34.5 (.06) 35.6 (.06) 20.5 (.05)
Arrest rate 2.79 (.72) 3.09 (.83) 2.67 (.65) 2.66 (.73)
Prosecuted charge rate 1.96 (.59) 2.00 (.62) 1.95 (.57) 2.03 (.72)
Drug arrest rate 1.65 (.52) 1.98 (.67) 1.52 (.44) 1.63 (.68)
Implied index crime rate 1.44 (.66) 1.07 (.66) 1.65 (.61) 1.50 (.83)
Estimated social cost ($):
Arrests only 16,111 (8,555) 15,182 (9,786) 13,363 (6,920) 12,549 (10,931)
Implied index crimes 26,855 (13,897) 22,378 (14,773) 22,992 (11,576) 21 ,062 (16,976)
Note. For columns 1, 3, and 4, N p 73 offenders; N p 55 drug offenders in column 2. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Index crimes include murder, assault, rape, robbery, burglary, car theft, and larceny.
A large fraction of these offenses are drug offenses—1.6 drug arrests are made
per person per year, roughly 57 percent of all charges. Applying crime- and
agency-speciﬁc clearance rates to the nondrug arrests, the arrests accumulated
by individuals suggest that 23–25-year-old unlucky former delinquents would
have been involved in 1.4 index crimes per person per year had they not been
incarcerated.
31 An upper bound of offending behavior can be estimated by in-
ﬂating the clearance-rate-adjusted estimates by the fraction of crimes reported
to police—this increases the potential rate of crimes averted from 1.4 to 2.9
crimes per year.
32 Lucky delinquents are arrested for a large number of violent
crimes during their free time: 20 percent of the arrests accumulated are for
assault or attempted murder,
33 4 percent for arson, and 3 percent for weapons
violations. Approximately 17 percent of arrests are for property and general
crimes, such as car theft, conspiracy, trespassing, and uttering false statements
to police. The pattern of recidivism suggests some degree of specialization in
crime; individuals convicted of drug offenses (column 2) are arrested an average
of 3.1 times per person per year, roughly equal to the mean arrest rate for the
entire group, but appear to be less likely than average to be involved in index
crimes, which implies that they are rearrested for drug offenses. Reestimating
31 Of those individuals who recidivate, the mean number of arrests per person per year is 9.7,
with 6.9 charges ﬁled per person per year. Clearance rates suggest that individuals who are rearrested
are probably involved in 5.2 index crimes per person per year. These estimates are notably similar
to the “high-rate offender” rate of 7 offenses per person per year assumed by Greenwood et al.
(1996).
32 This estimate is produced by calculating the incident-weighted mean index crime-reporting rate
for each index crime, excluding murder, as recorded in the National Crime Victimization Survey
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) data between 2002 and 2004 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2007).
These reporting rates are based on a representative sample of crime reporting in the 30 largest MSAs,
which include Baltimore and Prince George’s County. The unweighted mean reporting rates in these
Maryland jurisdictions are within 4 percentage points of the national rates, with the exception of
robbery, where the reporting rate is 10 percentage points lower. Substituting the local robbery-
reporting rate for the national one does not affect my estimate.
33 For cost-beneﬁt purposes, I classify charges for attempted murder as assaults.Sentence Enhancements 567
these measures of criminal activity using the upper and lower bounds of a 95
percent conﬁdence interval around my estimate of days incarcerated per point
(columns 3 and 4) yields substantively the same results.
These estimates are an order of magnitude lower than those produced by
previous studies of the incapacitation effect using individual-level data. Recall
that existing estimates range from 187 to approximately 12 crimes averted per
person per year. This striking difference highlights the contribution this paper
makes to the literature on incapacitation. First, all of the previous studies base
their estimates on samples of current prison or jail inmates, who may or may
not be nearing release. In contrast, my study assesses the effect of incapacitation
only on offenders who are about to be released. These offenders will, on average,
be less criminal than the average inmate (Kuziemko 2007), whose behavior has
been the focus of existing literature.
Second, previous studies often rely on past criminal behavior to create mean
estimates of incapacitation. This practice creates samples in which all individuals
have nonzero hypothetical offense rates by construction. Moreover, there are
good reasons to believe that a given offender’s criminal activity prior to incar-
ceration is signiﬁcantly higher than the criminal activity he would partake in if
released early.
34 In contrast, my estimates suggest that approximately two-thirds
of individuals would not recidivate during the enhancement portion of their
sentences.
Third, I present incapacitation estimates for a particular subsetof theoffending
population. Although past estimates often break down the beneﬁt of incapaci-
tation by offense type, my estimates are averaged over all offense types, but my
population is comparatively homogenous with respect to age. Although they are
not necessarily at the end of their criminal careers, 23–25-year-olds, who are
between the ages of 25 and 27 when released, are past their peak criminal years,
which are generally agreed to be between 18 and 21 (Hirschi and Gottfredson
1983; Farrington 1986; Blumstein and Cohen 1987). For example, according to
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2005, 49 percent of homicides were committed
by someone younger than 25, a group that made up roughly 34 percent of the
population. Because criminality decreases with age (Hirschi and Gottfredson
1983; Farrington 1986; Blumstein and Cohen 1987), one would expect the num-
ber of crimes averted through incapacitation to decline as the population being
targeted ages.
Finally, it should be noted that past studies used data from the 1980s and
1990s, whereas my estimates are based on data from 2001 to 2005. If the decline
in crime over the end of the twentieth century is due to individuals’ committing
less crime, as opposed to fewer individuals committing crime, the number of
crimes averted through incapacitation in the twenty-ﬁrst century should be rea-
sonably assumed to be lower than in the twentieth century.
I estimate that 23–25-year-olds incarcerated for 1 additional year would likely
34 This is one of Zimring and Hawkins (1995) critiquesof“window-based”incapacitationestimates.568 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
have been arrested at a rate of approximately 2.8 times per year per person, if
released early, and would have been prosecuted for two offenses. There are two
important and potentially confounding issues that must be addressed in order
to say that these crimes are averted through incapacitation: temporal displace-
ment of crime and criminal replacement.
Consider a three-period model in which all offenders are incarceratedinperiod
1, half of offenders are released at the beginning of period 2, and the rest are
released at the beginning of period 3. If sentence enhancements cause only
temporal displacements in crime rates, we would expect that, in period3,unlucky
offenders would have higher offending rates than those released earlier. It is
possible to directly test for this possibility by comparing the number of charges
accumulated by the 57 released unlucky delinquents to the 50 released lucky
delinquents whom I observe two periods after being incarcerated.
35 Using a
negative binomial model to account for overdispersion in charges,
36 I ﬁnd no
evidence that unlucky delinquents offend at higher rates than the lucky delin-
quents after controlling for differences in criminal background, jurisdiction of
release, age, and race.
A second threat to my incapacitation estimates is the issue of criminal re-
placement, which Ehrlich (1981) identiﬁes in a seminal article on incarceration
and crime.
37 The idea of criminal replacement is that some fraction of the crimes
that would have been committed by incarcerated individuals are committed by
nonincarcerated offenders. With regard to drug offenses and organized crime,
criminal replacement is clearly observed. In fact, Caulkins et al. (1997) suggest
that, in terms of reducing the total supply of illegal drugs, conducting a drug
crackdown in which more arrests are made is a more effective policy than
increasing the sentence of one drug offender.
38 I am unaware of empirical evi-
dence of signiﬁcant criminal replacement for other types of offenses. The ex-
istence of criminal replacement would cause me to overestimate the number of
crimes prevented through incapacitation. My data do not allow me to test this
phenomenon.
5. The Social Welfare of Sentence Enhancements
I ﬁnd evidence that sentence enhancements do lower crime through inca-
pacitation, although the marginal number of crimes averted by incapacitation
35 I do not observe any street time for 23 of the 73 released lucky delinquents after their sentence
disenhancements expire.
36 Results of this estimation are available by request and are discussed in detail in Owens (2007).
37 An issue tangential to criminal replacement is co-offending. I have no way of knowing whether
individuals in my data are arrested for offenses they commit with another person, but criminologists
generally assume that co-offending rates are highest relative to total offending among juveniles. With
an average postrelease age of 25, I assume co-offending is not a large issue for my analysis.
38 The intuition behind this ﬁnding is that arrests directly decrease the drug supply—that is, drugs
are seized—whereas incarcerating a drug dealer only creates a possible opening for a new potential
dealer.Sentence Enhancements 569
as a result of sentence enhancements is lower than the average number of crimes
prevented by incarceration in general. To evaluate these incapacitative effects, it
is useful to assign a monetary cost to criminal acts. This assignment allows a
comparison of the social costs of reduced incapacitation and the ﬁscal costs
associated with incarcerating an offender for an additional period. According to
estimates derived in Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996), the social cost of the
crimes potentially prevented by incapacitation resulting from a 1-year sentence
enhancement varies from a low estimate of $16,000, if each arrest is assumed
to represent one crime, to just under $27,000, if each arrest is inﬂated by the
appropriate clearance rates. More recent studies (Cohen et al. 2004; Rockoff and
Linden 2006) have suggested that the social cost of crime may be signiﬁcantly
higher. Still, the estimates of Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996) provide the
most disaggregated estimates for the largest number of crimes and yield the most
conservative dollar values.
How do these social costs compare to the additional cost to society of imposing
longer sentences? I evaluate the dollar value of crimes averted through inca-
pacitation against the ﬁscal cost of housing an additional state prisoner for an
additional year in Maryland. Note that this evaluation excludes the additional
social cost imposed on the families of inmates who receive longer sentences.
Therefore, I ask the speciﬁc question, how large does the social cost of sentence
enhancements have to be for them to decrease net welfare?
In 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice estimated that the average annual
operating cost of a state prison nationwide was $24,032 per inmate in 2005
dollars (Stephen 2004). Between 1989 and 2005, the state of Maryland spent
approximately $23,748 per inmate per year (Maryland 1990–2007). Past studies
of incapacitation (DiIulio and Piehl 1991, 1995; Donohue and Siegelman 1998;
Spelman 1994) evaluate the beneﬁt of crimes averted against this average cost
per prisoner. Average cost is an appropriate benchmark against which to evaluate
the beneﬁts of incapacitation only if the increase in state spending when a facility
incarcerates its ﬁrst prisoner is exactly the same as the increase in state spending
when that facility incarcerates its 500th prisoner. This notion is unlikely to be
true because of the high ﬁxed costs of maintaining and operating a prison. If
the prison population increases by one person, the state will have to provide an
additional meal but not an additional cook.
In principle, the marginal cost of an additional prisoner approaches inﬁnity
after the institution reaches full capacity, but anecdotal evidence andtheexistence
of prison-overcrowding legislation suggest that, operationally, corrections de-
partments will make room for new prisoners.
39 Before 2000, the Maryland state
budget books reported ofﬁcial prison capacity as well as average daily population.
According to these sources, Maryland state facilities were operating at or above
39 In related work, Kuziemko and Levitt (2004) ﬁnd that the increased number of prisoners
convicted of drug offenses did result in the crowding out of inmates convicted of minor offenses,
but the fraction of sentences served by offenders convicted of violent crimes or major property
offenses was unchanged by increases in the inﬂow of inmates.570 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
capacity more than half of the time between ﬁscal years 1989 and 2000 (Maryland
1990–2007).
To estimate the marginal cost of housing a former delinquent for an additional
year, I use a ﬁxed-effects approach, where my identiﬁcation is based on changes
in inmate population and expenditure within a facility, not differences across
facilities. I express total expenditure each year in a given facility as a function
of the average daily population, including year and facility ﬁxed effects, as well
as dummy variables indicating that ofﬁcial capacity increased or decreased during
that year. It is easy to think of omitted variables that are correlated with both
population and expenditure, such as the age of the facility or the quality of the
management, and a ﬁxed-effects model allows me to avoid these sources of bias.
I allow the marginal cost of an additional prisoner to vary according to whether
there is a change in capacity and whether the prisoner is housed in a maximum-
, medium-, or minimum-security facility. Data on average daily population, total
facility expenditure, and capacity for a total of 24 state-run institutions are taken
from the Maryland state budget books (Maryland 1990–2007), which report
actual values for ﬁscal years 1989–2005. The ﬁscal year 1993 is excluded because
of missing data.
Estimates of the marginal cost of housing an additional prisoner are presented
in Table 6. When I control for upgrades and downgrades in ofﬁcial capacity
(column 3), increasing the average daily population by one person for 1 year
requires an increase in spending of $11,350 ( ), less than half the average t p 5.54
cost of incarceration per inmate. Not surprisingly, during years when the capacity
of the facility increases, the marginal cost of an extra prisoner is about $1,000
less. Housing an additional prisoner in a moderate-security facility (column 5)
costs the state $13,030 ( ), approximately $8,000 more than housing the t p 5.29
additional prisoner in a minimum-security facility. To address concerns that the
marginal cost of a prisoner is increasing in prison population, I included average
daily population squared as a dependent variable. Surprisingly, I estimate the
coefﬁcient on this term to be negative, although small in magnitude and statis-
tically insigniﬁcant.
I estimate the ﬁscal cost of incarcerating an additional offender for an ad-
ditional year to be at most $13,800, and in most years closer to $11,350. This
marginal cost is slightly more than half the annual expenditure per inmate. It
is also roughly equivalent to the lower estimated social costs of crimes avoided
per person per year through incapacitation in Table 5. This ﬁnding suggests that
increasing the sentence length of offenders between 23 and 25 years old may
generate positive net beneﬁts to society.
Recall that I do not attempt to quantify the social cost of an additional year
of incarceration, such as a family’s emotional distress. How large must these
costs be to reverse this conclusion? The social cost of crimes averted through
incapacitating a 23–25-year-old former delinquent are likely to fall between
$12,500 and $26,000 a year. Depending on the security level of the facility and
changes in that facility’s ofﬁcial capacity, the ﬁscal cost of an additional year ofT
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incarceration in Maryland ranges from $4,700 to $13,800 per person. In the
most likely scenario, where the state spends $11,350 per prisoner per year, the
net beneﬁt of sentence enhancements is between $1,150 and $14,600 per prisoner
per year. In a worst-case scenario, where incarceration is extremely expensive,
beneﬁts range from a $1,300 net loss to a $12,200 gain. In a best-case scenario,
the social costs of additional periods of incarceration must be more than $21,300
per prisoner per year for the net beneﬁt of sentence enhancements to be strictly
negative.
6. Conclusion
Sentence enhancements reduce crime by deterring potential offenders from
committing crimes and by preventing convicted offenders from reoffending
through lengthened incapacitation. In this paper I focus on the latter effect. I
use a change in Maryland sentencing law that eliminated juvenile history as a
factor in the sentencing of 23–25-year-olds as a source of quasi-experimental
variation in sentence length, which allows me to avoid bias due to nonrandom
assignment of punishment. I estimate that incarcerated 23–25-year-old former
delinquents are arrested at a rate of 2.8 times per person per year and are involved
in 1.4–1.6 index crimes per person per year during their postrelease window of
free time.
This estimate of crimes averted is much smaller but more precise than previous
estimates of crimes avoided through incapacitation because I identify the ad-
ditional beneﬁt of incarcerating an offender for 1 additional year, whereas pre-
vious studies have tended to look at the average beneﬁt of the entire incarcerated
population. The large difference between my ﬁndings and past researchhighlights
the importance of identifying the speciﬁc population affected by a policy change.
This paper also ﬁts in a series of recent papers reexamining the social beneﬁts
of prison during a time when crime rates are at historic lows and incarceration
rates at equally striking highs (Sweeten and Apel 2007; Johnson and Raphael
2007).
My results are consistent with these recent papers in ﬁnding that, over time,
the beneﬁt of incapacitation has decreased. However, even though I ﬁnd that
the incapacitative beneﬁts of sentence enhancements are perhaps smaller than
previously thought, the social cost of the crimes that offender would otherwise
commit during that 1-year period is higher than the ﬁscal cost of extending the
sentence of an offender with an established criminal history. After controlling
for facility upgrades and allowing the impact of additional prisoners to vary
nonlinearly, I ﬁnd that the cost to the state of holding a prisoner for an additional
year is less than half of the average spending per inmate, which suggests a
substantial ﬁxed cost to operating a correctional facility. Although it is up to
policy makers to decide whether anticipated changes in inmate population are
large enough to make average cost the relevant metric in a more comprehensiveSentence Enhancements 573
cost-beneﬁt analysis, the difference in costs is large enough to warrant consid-
eration.
Given recent work that ﬁnds no negative labor market consequences associated
with longer prison spells (Kling 2006; Cho and LaLonde 2005), it seems unlikely
that the social costs associated with longer periods of incarceration would be
large enough for sentence enhancements to fail a cost-beneﬁt analysis. More
work on the broader social costs of sentence enhancements is needed to sub-
stantiate this claim. However, my results suggest that only in the case in which
additional incapacitation is the least beneﬁcial and incarceration is the most
expensive does the incapacitative effect of sentence enhancements fail to provide
a positive net beneﬁt to society.
Appendix
Estimation Procedures
Incorporating Incomplete Sentences
In 766 sentences, an individual enters prison or jail but is not released. Let
be the length of the spell completed at the time when the sample was drawn.
c Si
The relationship between the actual length and measured length is then
c S*i fS *! S i i i S p , i cc {} S if S X S* i i i
where if is greater than zero and the offender is released by the end
i S p S* S* ii
of my sample. Let di equal one if sentence i is complete, and zero otherwise.
The likelihood function is therefore
c [] () ( ) L(L ) p d ln h(S , L )  1  d ln 1 HS  1, L , []  {} ii i i i i i
where Li represents the values of the independent variables associated with sen-
tence i, , is the negative binomial probability density function evaluated h(S , L ) ii
at Si, and is the negative binomial cumulative density function
c H(S  1, L ) ii
evaluated at 1.
c Si
Estimation of Individual Sentence Enhancements
Expected sentence length for any given conviction is equivalent to the expected
number of days incarcerated multiplied by the probability that the sentence
results in any incarceration:
() ES *FX ii
NN exp () qb Facts v OldGuide v D v OldGuide #D [ ] i OG i D i OGD ii () p PS * 1 0FX , ii d574 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
where
PP () PS * 1 0FX pF[b Facts a OldGuide ii i OG i
()  a D a OldGuide #D ], D i OGD ii
where F(x) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function evaluated
at x. The additional number of days per point that an offender with k points
would have been incarcerated after sentence i is estimated to be
k Enhancementi
k Di PP ˆ [ ] ˆˆ ˆ () p FbFacts a OldGuide a D a OldGuide #D i OG i D i OGD ii () k
NN k ˆˆ ˆ ˆ [ ] () exp b Facts v OldGuide v D v OldGuide #D Q i OG i D i OGD ii i  , () ˆ k d
where
NN NN ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () ( ) exp b Facts v kv kv exp b Facts kv i OG D OGD i D k D p i ˆ [] d
NN NN ˆˆ ˆ () ( ) exp b Facts v exp b Facts i OG i  ˆ [] d
and
k PP PP ˆ ˆ () ( ) [ ] ˆ ˆˆ ˆ Q p FbFacts a ka ka FbFacts ka ii OG D OGD i D
PP PP ˆˆ () ( ) [] ˆ  FbFacts a FbFacts . i OG i
Two marginal effects are evaluated at each observation (one for each value of
k), and each receives a weight equal to the fraction of delinquents who qualify
for that number of points. The mean sentence disenhancement per point is the
weighted mean of the marginal effects.Table A1
In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Sentences for 23–25-Year-Olds
Final Sample
Not Matched to
Arrest Records
Not Matched to
Incarceration Period
Sentence length (months) 61.2 (200.60) 20.22 (64.73) 4.89 (14.76)
Incarcerated (%) 66.0 48.6 43.6
Total charges 1.52 (1.47) 1.30 (.78) 1.33 (.83)
Worst offense type (%):
Drug 61.9 59.4 44.3
Violent 28.5 27.7 33.1
Property 9.1 12.2 20.9
VOP .48 .68 1.63
Worst offense score 5.06 (2.19) 4.24 (1.84) 3.53 (2.00)
Delinquent points
a .09 (.34) .03 (.21) .05 (.27)
Adult prior points
a 2.64 (1.76) 1.84 (1.82) 1.46 (1.50)
Violation points
a .32 (.47) .21 (.41) .19 (.39)
Relationship points
a .40 (.49) .26 (.44) .24 (.42)
Sentenced under old guidelines (%) 38.1 35.9 37.5
Age at offense 23.9 (.818) 23.9 (.813) 23.9 (.804)
Black (%) 82.1 72.2 49.6
Sentences 3,345 1,336 1,166
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. VOP p violation of parole.
aUsed to calculate the offender score.T
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Table A3
Mean Number of Offenses per Arrest per Agency, 1999–2003
National Average
(20,388 Agencies)
Maryland
(185 Agencies)
Baltimore City Police
Department
Assault 1.78 (1.84) 1.63 (1.04) 2.06 (2.06)
Murder 1.28 (.96) 1 .26 (.85) 1.56 (.39)
Rape 2.39 (2.57) 1.86 (1.29) 2.76 (.90)
Robbery 3.05 (2.87) 3.64 (4.41) 4.36 (.62)
Burglary 9.44 (12.10) 7.16 (6.63) 6.43 (1.34)
Larceny 10.07 (17.26) 9.08 (14.72) 7.42 (1.92)
Car Theft 6.70 (15.68) 6.17 (11.47) 6.23 (1.42)
Source. Author’s calculations from Federal Bureau of Investigation (2001–5).
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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